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Executive summary 
 
After nearly a quarter of century of structural adjustment and liberalization, a discussion of 
labor institutions in Africa still seems unrealistic. Such institutions concern only the formal 
sector, which employs less than 5 percent of the workforce in most African countries. 
Organized labor is mainly active in highly protected sectors, such as the civil service and 
public utilities, or in local branches of foreign firms. Most African labor works in the rural 
sector and in the urban informal sector.  
 
Moreover, the labor market institutions that do manage to prevail in Africa are quite diverse. 
To a large extent, that diversity results from the wide gap existing between the legal or 
regulatory framework supposed to prevail in some countries and the actual pattern of 
behavior that can be observed. Hence, labor market institutions are in fact a complex blend of 
formal and informal sets of constraints and incentives that shape the functioning of this 
market. 
 
The survey data presented have shown that firms distinguish clearly between labor market 
rigidity and regulation. For example, although hiring and above all firing problems are widely 
perceived as a major obstacle to firm development, they are not necessarily blamed on 
regulations. The divergence between the two indicators may reflect both the differential level 
of enforcement in different countries and the fact that employment protection is often 
performed directly by trade unions. Moreover, a tradeoff between labor market regulation and 
union density seems to come out of the data. The more extensive involvement of the 
government in the labor market seems to have undercut organized labor. Casual observation 
suggests that this government involvement tends to make labor market outcomes more 
predictable, with a positive impact on productivity. Further research is needed to check this 
point and to determine its impact on the development of the formal economy. 
 
If indeed there is a tradeoff between labor market regulation and union density, deregulating 
the labor market is not necessarily the best way to implement the much-needed improvements 
in labor market flexibility in Africa. Thus, there is not likely to be a quick fix through labor 
market liberalization. All the benefits of labor market flexibility could thus be undone by 
increasing union density. Further research should aim at identifying the other determinants of 
this tradeoff, to identify better the scope for an institutional policy aimed at improving labor 
market outcomes.  
 
In the informal sector, the rules of the game are imposed neither by the government nor by 
the unions, but by the traditional institutional framework of kinship and ethnicity. The recent 
economic history of African countries does not suggest that the traditional framework 
provides the most favorable conditions for attracting large investment, particularly foreign 
direct investment. Hence, the challenge of African growth in the coming decades is certainly 
pointing to the formalization of the labor market as a desirable path to follow. The optimum 
point on the tradeoff between regulation and union density will probably have to be country-
specific. It will depend on each country’s legal history, formal and traditional institutions, and 
political aspirations. 
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1. The regulatory framework 
 
Why do governments intervene in the labor market? The theory underlying most 
interventions is that free labor markets are imperfect, and that as a consequence there are 
rents in the employment relationship, and that employers abuse workers to extract these rents, 
leading to both unfairness and inefficiency. For example, employers discriminate against 
disadvantaged groups, underpay workers who are immobile or invest in firm-specific capital, 
fire workers who then need to be supported by the state, force employees to work more than 
they wish under the threat of dismissal, and so on (Botero et al., 2003). In response to the 
perceived unfairness and inefficiency of the free market employment relationship, nearly 
every state intervenes in this relationship to protect the workers. 
 
Regulation of labor markets aiming to protect workers from employers takes three forms. 
First, governments forbid discrimination in the labor market and endow the workers with 
some “basic rights” in the on-going employment relationships, such as protection against 
forced labor, protection against gender or race discrimination, or protection for working 
children. Second, in response to the power of employers against workers, governments 
empower labor unions to represent workers collectively, and protect particular union 
strategies in negotiations with employers. Finally, governments regulate employment 
relationships, for example restricting the range of feasible contracts and raising the costs of 
both laying off workers and increasing hours of work. 
 
Assessment of the regulatory framework 
 
Even if a huge part of African economies stands beside the legal framework through 
informality and poor compliance, the regulatory framework of the labor market is surely one 
of the most rigid through out the world. 
 
When running RPED surveys, firms were asked to identify issues that could be problematic 
for the operation and growth of their business. We report in table 1.1 to what extend does the 
labor regulation represent an obstacle to firms’ development. The percentage of firm 
perceiving labor regulation as a major or severe obstacle to their economic development lies 
between 4.6 percent for Ethiopia and 22.5 percent for Kenya. These percentages do not 
follow the same pattern as the rigidity of employment index found in table 1.2 across 
countries. Only 12.1 percent of firms in the most rigid labor market (Tanzania) find labor 
regulation problematic, compared with almost 11 percent in the most flexible labor market 
(Uganda). 
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Table 1.1. Labor regulations as obstacles to development in selected African countries 
 Survey group Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya Tanzania Uganda Zambia 
  (2002) (2002) (2003) (2003) (2003) (2002) 
% of firms quoting labor regulation as 
a significant obstacle 1 5.1 (78)
  4.6 (416) 22.5 (275) 12.1 (272) 10.8 (259) 16.9 (207) 
By firm size                         
[1-9] 0.0 (7) 0.6 (171) 0.0 (9) 6.3 (48) 17.5 (40) 0.0 (1) 
[10-49] 2.6 (38) 1.5 (130) 21.3 (89) 1.3 (107) 6.9 (131) 10.0 (60) 
[50-99] 7.7 (13) 21.4 (28) 28.3 (46) 12.5 (48) 6.5 (31) 20.0 (50) 
>100 10.0 (20) 11.5 (87) 24.3 (115) 16.7 (66) 17.5 (57) 19.5 (87) 
By ownership structure                         
Private domestic 1.9 (53) 3.0 (333) 23.2 (181) 10.0 (200) 9.7 (186) 17.0 (147) 
Private foreign 0.0 (4) 13.3 (15) 14.3 (35) 25.0 (44) 13.1 (61) 17.3 (52) 
State 14.3 (14) 12.5 (56) 26.7 (15) 0.0 (10) 28.6 (7) 16.7 (6) 
Other 14.3 (7) 0.0 (12) 23.8 (42) 15.4 (13) 0.0 (4) 0.0 (2) 
Total number of firms surveyed 79 427 284 276 300 207 
Note: Data in parentheses indicate number of respondents. 
1 Indicates the percentage of firms which have associated an obstacle index of 3 or 4 to each issue. Knowing that: 0 = no obstacle; 1 = minor obstacle; 
2 = moderate obstacle; 3 = major obstacle; 4 = very severe obstacle. 
Source: Authors’ computation from the firm level surveys (World Bank). 
 
Hence, there is no real adequacy between actual employment labor laws and their perceived 
impact on firms functioning. This inadequacy first highlights the difficulty to catch all the 
different facet of labor regulation through synthetic indexes. The Doing Business Indexes 
prove helpful, because they constitute the only available source of information about labor 
legislation in Africa. These indexes only take into account what is actually written in the 
country law, no matter its implementation or enforcement. Nonetheless, firms’ perception of 
the labor regulation as an obstacle to business running may also be biased. In countries where 
economic infrastructures are very poor and insufficient, firms may have a tendency to 
underestimate labor regulation’s impact on their business. In some countries, the fact that a 
significant number of firms quote labor regulation as a significant obstacle may simply more 
highlights that the labor law is actually enforced rather than it is too rigid. Finally, this 
inadequacy might reflect that labor regulations are seen more dysfunctional than simply rigid 
or flexible. Both trade unions and employers are seen as strongly influencing labor laws by a 
relatively large percentage of firms. Both parties might end up being locked in with 
inefficient compromises. 
 
Collective relations law and workers’ civil rights 
 
A huge majority of African countries have ratified the International Labor Standard 
Conventions. The ratification rate goes from 80.5 percent for Convention No. 138 involving 
the effective abolition of child labor to 100 percent for Convention No. 29 that suppresses the 
use of forced or compulsory labor in all its forms. However, we underline in this section the 
huge gaps between the ratification of ILO’s conventions and national laws on the one hand, 
and between national laws and their enforcement in practice on the other hand. 
 
The rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining 
 
The right to organize. In a large number of countries (like Benin, Botswana, Niger, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Zambia, and so on), even if the Labor Code recognizes the right to organize,1 it 
should be kept in mind that the majority of workers are excluded from the Labor Code 
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because they work in agriculture or the informal economy, where the Labor Code is usually 
not enforced. 
 
Trade unions’ registration. Even if the right to organize is fully recognized by the national 
law, trade unions’ official registration can be an obstacle that considerably shrinks the 
freedom of organization in practice. In several African countries trade unions have to register 
with official organs (Ministry of Civil Liberties in Burkina Faso, Ministry of Justice in 
Angola, Ministry of Labor in Nigeria, or the Ministry of Interior in Senegal), implying 
possible government pressures to deny some trade unions’ existence.2 
 
The right to strike. This right is very often violated in practice in Sub-Sahara African 
countries. The most widely used tool by authorities to restrict strikes is to define “essential 
services” where workers are denied the right to strike. The problem is that the definition of 
these essential services are often much broader than what is recommended by the ILO.3 In 
practice, a huge part of the civil servants are considered as “essential services” workers. For 
example labor inspectors and magistrates in Burkina Faso; transport, sanitation, electricity, 
petrol, pharmacy, post, telecom, banks and water supply in Ethiopia; energy, health, policing 
and telecom in Mali; teachers in Nigeria; power, sewerage, and certain mining operation in 
Zambia; and so on. 
 
Collective bargaining. While almost all African countries have ratified the ILO’s convention 
on the right to bargain freely,4 there are large differences across countries in the enforcement 
of the right to collective bargaining. In Burkina Faso, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Namibia, 
Niger, Senegal, and South Africa, collective bargaining agreements are in effect in many 
formal major business enterprises and sectors of the civil service. In several countries there 
are significant differences between the public and the private sectors.  
 
The elimination of employment discrimination 
 
We can roughly split Africa into two parts concerning equal remuneration for men and 
women workers for work of equal value.5 On the one hand we have countries where women 
face serious legal discrimination (Botswana, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Madagascar, 
Mozambique, Rwanda or Tanzania). On the other hand, in many countries discrimination 
concerning employment and occupation is strictly prohibited by law (Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, 
Guinea, Lesotho, Mauritius Namibia, Niger, Senegal, South Africa Swaziland, Togo or 
Zambia). However discrimination does occur as a result of traditional views on the role of 
women in society, concentration in a few economic sectors, and limited access to education. 
It should be noticed that discrimination against women takes place essentially in rural areas, 
where they make up the majority of rural farmers. 
 
The abolition of child labor 
 
Almost all African countries have ratified Convention No. 138 (1973).6 A member whose 
economy and administrative facilities are insufficiently developed may, after consultation 
with the organizations of employers and workers concerned, where such exist, initially limit 
the scope of application of this Convention.  
 
The large majority of child labor takes place in what can be called “informal child labor,” that 
is, children working in small family subsistence farming, in traditional apprenticeship system, 
in family owned small businesses or in housework. In fact, very few working children appear 
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to be wage employed. Hence, international labor standards do not apply to most working 
children. 
 
The establishment of a minimum wage 
 
More than 78 percent of African countries have ratified the ILO’s minimum wage fixing 
machinery convention for manufacturing and commercial sectors. However, this percentage 
decreases to only 33 percent for agriculture and 15 percent for other economic sectors. The 
setting of the minimum wage provides in principle a floor to earnings for workers. However, 
the legislation of most countries excludes groups of workers from the scheme who thus 
legally earn subminimum wages. Estimates of the share of workers covered by a minimum 
wage system are scarce. Besides legally noncovered workers, some workers earn wages 
below the minimum because the employer fails to comply with the legislation. In fact, most 
African governments appear not to enforce strict compliance with minimum wages. 
 
Employment law 
 
Employment laws regulate the individual employment relation, including the alternatives to 
the standard employment contract, the flexibility of working conditions, and the termination 
of employment. To capture all these effects four indexes are reported (Doing Business 2004): 
a difficulty of hiring index, the rigidity of hours index, a difficulty of firing index and an 
overall rigidity of employment index, which is the average of the first three indexes. Each 
index may take values between 0 and 100, with higher values indicating more rigid 
regulation. The firing costs are also included. The data on hiring and firing workers are based 
on a detailed study of employment laws and regulations, as well as relevant constitutional 
provisions. Hence, informal employment is not taken into account when computing these 
indexes. 
 
Table 1.2 displays these employment laws indexes for 33 different African countries. Africa 
exhibits the highest scores in terms of difficulty of hiring as well as in terms of the rigidity of 
working hours. This makes African labor market far more rigid in terms of employment than 
East Asia. Concerning the legal difficulties faced by firm to fire workers, African countries 
stand just behind South Asia, which seems to be the most rigid region in terms of firing 
legislation. Therefore, labor market rigidity concerning layoff procedures ensures relatively 
high protection to African workers.  
 
These three indexes put African countries’ labor markets as the most rigid in the world on 
average. Theses aspects may not enable firms to adapt to positive or negative market demand 
shocks in terms of employment. However, firing costs do not seem to be too high and are 
comparable with what can be found in East Asia.  
 
The legal framework concerning hiring procedures, working hours and dismissals is certainly 
not widely observed in the informal sector. Therefore, important employment flexibility may 
be a possible reason for firms to operate in more informal sectors. 
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Table 1.2. Indexes of employment laws, by region and country  
Country Difficulty of Hiring Index 
Rigidity of Hours 
Index 
Difficulty of Firing 
Index 
Rigidity of Employment 
Index 
Firing Costs 
(weeks) 
East Asia and Pacific 20 30 22 24 52 
Europe and Central Asia 31 51 42 41 38 
Latin America and Caribbean 44 53 34 44 70 
Middle East and North Africa 22 52 40 38 74 
OECD: High-income 26 50 26 34 40 
South Asia 37 36 53 42 84 
Sub-Saharan Africa 53 64 50 56 59 
Angola 44 80 100 75 116 
Benin 72 60 50 61 54 
Botswana 0 20 40 20 19 
Burkina Faso 100 100 70 90 80 
Burundi 50 40 60 50 41 
Cameroon 61 80 80 74 46 
Central African Republic 89 80 60 76 37 
Chad 100 80 60 80 47 
Congo 89 80 90 86 42 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 72 100 60 77 62 
Côte-d'Ivoire 78 100 30 69 92 
Ethiopia 50 60 20 43 48 
Ghana 11 40 50 34 25 
Guinea 67 80 30 59 133 
Kenya 22 20 30 24 47 
Lesotho 0 60 20 27 47 
Madagascar 28 60 60 49 41 
Malawi 22 20 20 21 90 
Mali 78 60 60 66 81 
Mauritania 89 60 60 70 31 
Mozambique 72 80 40 64 141 
Namibia 0 60 40 33 26 
Niger 100 100 70 90 76 
Nigeria 22 80 30 44 13 
Rwanda 89 80 60 76 54 
Senegal 61 60 70 64 38 
Sierra Leone 78 80 70 76 188 
South Africa 56 40 60 52 38 
Tanzania, United Republic of 56 80 60 65 38 
Togo 89 80 60 76 84 
Uganda 0 20 0 7 12 
Zambia 0 40 40 27 47 
Zimbabwe 11 40 20 24 29 
Note: Index components are scored between 0 and 100, with 100 representing the highest level of regulation. The Rigidity of Employment Index is the average of 
the first three indexes, and varies from 0 to 100. 
Source: The World Bank, The original methodology and data come from The Regulation of Labor, by Juan Botero, et al. (2004). 
 
Labor regulation 
 
The basic question addressed in this section is, What determines the level of government 
intervention in the labor market? The interest groups theory (Olson 1965, Stigler 1971, and 
Becker 1983) assumes that labor regulations respond to the pressure from trade unions, 
employers’ organizations, powerful individual firms, or informal groups of firms. 
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To investigate this theory we use RPED surveys in some selected African countries. Firms 
were asked how much influence various groups have on recently enacted national labor laws 
and regulations that have a substantial impact on firm’s business. The surveys concentrate on 
the potential influence of trade unions, official employers’ organizations and regional or local 
government.  
 
The percentage of firms considering that one of the three groups influences the labor 
regulation is often quite high (between 18 to 48 percent). In all the surveyed countries (with 
the exception of Tanzania), the highest percentage of firms report that employers’ 
organizations have major influence on labor regulation. For instance in Zambia, almost one 
third of firms think that employers’ organizations have a huge influence on labor regulation, 
compared with less than 18 percent perceiving local authorities as the major labor regulation 
maker. In Kenya, this gap is much more reduced as 40 to 50 percent of firms quote 
employers’ organizations, trade unions, and government as having a significant influence on 
labor laws. 
 
Hence, labor law appears to be the result of a bargaining between these three main interest 
groups with a perceived stronger bargaining power on employers’ organizations side. This 
effective bargaining may explain why in Kenya and Zambia more than 20 percent of firms 
still report layoff procedures as a significant obstacle, while employers’ organizations seem 
to be the most powerful interest group.  
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2. Workers’ organizations 
 
What do unions do? Trade unions can be seen as organizations imposing “monopoly costs” to 
society, securing favorable pay and work conditions to their members by sharing supernormal 
profits with firms. By contrast, the “organizational view” (Freeman and Medoff, 1984) 
focuses on the economic benefits of unions, which facilitate worker participation and worker-
manager cooperation at the workplace. Unions can also be seen as political organizations, 
which wield pressure on government for legislative or political change.  
 
This section first portrays the extent and structure of trade union membership in Africa. Then 
we investigate the influence of unions on labor market outcomes, mainly through their 
influence on wages. Finally, we discuss the challenges African trade unions face to 
strengthen their activity and power. 
 
Membership 
 
African labor markets are far from reaching a level of union membership as high as the one 
observed in many developed countries (table 2.1). Indeed, African countries experience very 
low level of wage employment, the main base of trade unions. Moreover, given the costs of 
organizing workers in geographically dispersed rural areas, the locus of unionism is in urban 
areas and, within urban areas, in the formal economic sector that comprises “the wage-paying 
nonagricultural private firms and the public sector” (World Bank, 1995). This “modern” 
sector has been much eroded by the economic reforms and the liberalization process that took 
place from the 1980s on the African continent. 
 
Table 2.1. Union density in selected African countries, 1995 
(percent) 
Low 
(<10%) 
Intermediate 
(10%< <20%) 
High 
(>20%) 
Eritrea (7.2) 
Ethiopia (4.1) 
Gabon (2) 
Guinea (2.5) 
Mauritania (2.7) 
Uganda (3.9) 
Botswana (11.5) 
Cape Verde (16.9) 
Cameroon (14.7) 
Côte d’Ivoire (13) 
Kenya (16.9) 
Mali (13.7) 
Nigeria (17.2)1 
Swaziland (19.1) 
Zambia (12.5) 
Tanzania (17.4) 
Zimbabwe (13.9) 
Ghana (25.9)1 
Mauritius (25.9) 
Namibia (22)  
Senegal (21.9) 
South Africa (21.8) 
Note: Union density is the percentage of union members in all nonagricultural wage employment. The ILO figures on union membership are 
mostly based on a questionnaire on trade union membership and collective bargaining coverage sent to government, employers and union 
representatives. The others were provided by the ILO Regional Offices.  
1. Data are for 1990. 
Source: Authors’ classification from ILO (1997). 
 
First, union membership figures should be considered cautiously as they mainly come from 
self-reporting membership from local unions, which reflects different administrative and 
political practices (ILO, 1997). In order to make comparisons between countries possible, we 
consider here unionization as the percentage of union members in nonagricultural wage 
employment.  
 
According to Fashoyin and Matanmi (1996), there is a general link between the relative level 
of socioeconomic development and the degree of unionization or workers organizations. The 
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simple statistics in table 2.1 do not offer much support to this finding. Among the five 
African countries that exhibit a much higher level of union density than the average (Ghana, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Senegal, and South Africa), Ghana and Senegal are classified as low 
income countries, with a GDP per capita of $755 or less, whereas richer countries, such as 
Botswana or Gabon, show evidence of much lower level of membership. 
 
Table 2.2 focuses on the manufacturing sector only and offers another way of considering the 
extent of unionization in seven selected African countries:  
 
Table 2.2. Unionization in the manufacturing sector in selected African countries 
Survey group Eritrea 
(2002) 
Ethiopia 
(2002) 
Kenya 
(2003) 
Nigeria 
(2001) 
Tanzania 
(2003) 
Uganda 
(2003) 
Zambia 
(2002) 
Percentage of firms with 
unionized workers1 
58.3 
(79) 
19.4 
(407) 
63.6 
(253) 
50.2 
(221) 
51.6 
(246) 
10.1 
(298) 
56.1 
(173) 
Percentage of the labor 
force unionized2 
53.2 
(79) 3 
15.2 
(407) 
41.4 
(253) 
42.7 
(221) 
40.1 
(246) 
6.1 
(298) 
41.3 
(173) 
By firm size        
[1-9] 14 
(7) 
0.01 
(159) 
12.5 
(10) 
0 
(1) 
6.4 
(41) 
0 
(52) 
0 
(1) 
[10-49] 45.3 
(39) 
2.7 
(127) 
32.6 
(89) 
8.6 
(55) 
33.5 
(95) 
8.8 
(153) 
27.9 
(48) 
[50-99] 60.9 
(13) 
18.7 
(26) 
39.8 
(44) 
29.6 
(43) 
59.3 
(46) 
7.8 
(34) 
34 
(44) 
>100 77.2 
(20) 
61.5 
(86) 
51.8 
(110) 
63.0 
(122) 
57.7 
(64) 
23.5 
(59) 
56.7 
(76) 
By ownership structure4        
Private domestic 43.2 
(55) 
4.3 
(332) 
38.6 
(167) 
27.4 
(139) 
32.8 
(181) 
1.8 
(223) 
36.0 
(123) 
Private foreign 94.3 
(3) 
50.2 
(12) 
50.8 
(34) 
68.4 
(66) 
59.8 
(41) 
16.2 
(62) 
50.3 
(42) 
State 81.95 
(14) 
75.8 
(55) 
48.35 
(11) 
54.65 
(6) 
72.95 
(8) 
43.1 
(7) 
68.25 
(5) 
Other 49.2 
(6) 
0 
(2) 
41.6 
(38) 
50.5 
(4) 
48.5 
(10) 
0 
(4) 
95.5 
(2) 
Total number of firms 
surveyed 
79 427 284 232 276 300 207 
Note: Data in parentheses indicate number of respondents.  
1 Firms report to have at least one unionized worker. 
2 Firms report the percentage of their labor force which belongs to a trade union. 
3 In parenthesis: total number of firms concerned. 
4 Private domestic (more than 50% of the capital is owned by the private domestic sector). 
  Private foreign (more than 50% of the capital is owned by the private foreign sector). 
  State (more than 50% of the capital is owned by the state). 
  Other (when the owner is neither the private sector nor the state). 
 5 Percentage not significantly different (at the conventional 5 percent level) from the percentage computed for the private foreign firms. 
Source: Authors’ computation from the firm level surveys (World Bank). 
 
• First, note that in Ethiopia and Uganda, a very high percentage of manufacturing firms 
(respectively, 80 percent and 90 percent) declare having not even one unionized worker. 
In the other countries, more than half of the firms report the presence of unions, with 
Kenya exhibiting the highest percentage (64 percent). The only data we have for French-
speaking countries are from the 1990s. Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire registered the lowest 
proportion of unionized firms (respectively 31.4 percent and 23.4 percent) (Mazumdar 
and Mazaheri, 2000). 
 
• Second, as expected, unionization is low in Ethiopia and Uganda. In Kenya, Nigeria, 
Tanzania, and Zambia, around 40 percent of the workers appear to be unionized. 
Surprisingly, given the observation made in table 2.1 above, the highest unionization rate 
is found in Eritrea, where 53 percent of the manufacturing labor force belongs to a union.7  
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• Third, there is a clear correlation between unionism and firm size in all countries. The 
highest unionization rates are in large and very large firms.  
 
• Finally, unionization appears to be sensitive to the ownership structure of the 
manufacturing firms. The percentage of workers unionized is always the lowest in the 
domestic owned firms. Whereas the public firms seem to be the most unionized in four of 
the seven countries. 
 
The influence of trade unions on labor market outcomes and poverty 
 
Trade unions affect labor market outcomes and poverty by influencing the level of wages, the 
prevalence of wage inequality and discrimination, and the antipoverty strategies adopted in 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. 
 
The influence of trade unions on the level of wages 
 
The sources of union power. The union-nonunion wage differential is the most commonly 
used measure of union power. The theoretical literature on union power highlights several 
conditions under which a union can achieve a wage rate higher than the nonunion level 
(Booth, 1995):  
 
• First, there must be some economic rents or surplus in the product market that can be 
shared. This surplus mostly arises from market imperfections or regulation of a particular 
industry. Teal (1996) points out that the rent-sharing effect is significant in explaining 
wage rates using a sample of Ghanaian firms. He emphasizes firm size and private sector 
as the main determinants of the rent-sharing effect. Azam and Ris (2001) find a similar 
result for manufacturing firms in Côte d’Ivoire. In addition, they find some evidence of a 
“hold-up” effect, whereby trade unions are able to grab a share of the incremental profits 
resulting from irreversible investment. Furthermore, Alby (2004) shows that the rent-
sharing effect benefits the workers more, the higher up they are in the hierarchical ladder. 
In fact, the lower-ranking ones have a negative rent-sharing term. This study shows that 
an important source of the rent so shared is the monopsony power enjoyed by the firms on 
their local market for unskilled labor. 
 
• Second, the union ability to bargain on wages depends on the monopoly power of the 
trade unions. According to Salmon (2001), if one excludes the public sector and other 
protected sectors, the capacity of unions to achieve power by threatening to strike in the 
private sector is quite small in developing countries as unionization rate and bargaining 
coverage is generally lower than in industrialized countries and labor regulation more 
uncertain.  
 
The union wage premium in Africa. Only a few studies have been done on the extent of the 
union wage premium in Africa (table 2.3). 
 
• First, some studies do not manage to measure any significant effect of unions on wages. 
The usual explanation for the absence of a positive union-nonunion wage differential is 
that wage increases secured by unionized workers spill over to raise the wages of certain 
nonunion workers (Pencavel, 1995). In Zimbabwe, where there is an extremely strong 
positive correlation between unionization and firm size, the size effect is actually picked 
up by the higher level of unionization in larger firms (Velenchik, 1997). In South Africa, 
 12
most studies do not find any significant wage advantage for White unionized workers. 
When bargaining at the firm level, union negotiators often focus on increasing the lowest 
wages and narrowing the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers (Bendix, 
1996). This bargaining is thus more likely to concern black workers. 
 
• Second, in Cameroon and Senegal—the only two French-speaking countries for which we 
have data—union members seem to earn less than similar nonunionized workers. 
According to Rama (2000), these negative union premia suggest that union members may 
get other nonwage benefits that compensate for their lower earnings and that trade unions 
could have been used by governments in many CFA (Communauté Financière Africaine) 
countries to implement their wage moderation policies. However, Manda et al. (2001) 
discuss the same issue for the case of the Kenyan manufacturing sector, and show 
convincingly that the negative union premium is due to a mistaken empirical 
methodology. They show that the negative effect turns positive once due account is taken 
of selectivity effects. 
 
• Finally, in those countries where the union wage premium is positive (Ghana and South 
Africa), the value of this premium falls in the higher “developing countries” range.8 
Moreover, if one compares the results shown in table 2.3 with those found in developed 
countries, they are closer to the higher “American” range than to the lower “European” 
range. Blanchflower and Freeman (1990) demonstrate a contrast between the United 
States, where the union effect is some 20 percent and West Germany, Austria, and 
Switzerland, which have small union effects, between 4 percent and 8 percent. 
 
The spillover effect to nonunion members. Some nonunionized workers can be covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement. Thus basing union status on membership rather than 
coverage may lead to nonnegligible bias in estimating the union-nonunion wage differential 
(Jones, 1982). 
 
The firm level surveys provide some indirect information about the potential union wage 
spillover effect. Table 2.4 concentrates on Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.9 In those three 
countries, around 60 percent of the firms in the manufacturing sector report that nonunionized 
workers benefit from the wages unions are negotiating. Furthermore, this extension of union 
wage agreements to nonunionized workers appears to be higher in large firms (with more 
than 50 workers) and in the firms predominantly owned by the state.  
 
• Focusing on South Africa, Butcher and Rouse (2001) observe that black nonunion 
workers covered by industrial council agreement earn about 10 percent significantly more 
than those not covered. In contrast, the difference is not statistically significant for white 
workers.  
 
• Using a data set from Ghana, Blunch, and Verner (2001) find another type of spillover 
effect on wages of nonunion workers. This effect is estimated by introducing a variable 
measuring the union density of the sector.10 This variable does not seem to influence 
wages directly. However, when the worker is trained, the degree of unionization of the 
sector affects individual wages positively, suggesting that unions’ bargaining power 
allows them to extract some of the rents from the firm training and share it with workers. 
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Table 2.3. The union wage effect in selected African countries 
Country 
 
Union wage effect 
 
Sample Econometric methodology and comments Data set Source 
Cameroon -12.9% Formal manufacturing  
Workers 
(1) pooled regression with an individual union 
membership dummy 
2 waves of RPED* 
(1993) 
Thomas and Vallée (1996) 
      
Ghana 15.7% Formal manufacturing  
Workers 
(1) with an individual union membership 
dummy 
RPED 
(1994) 
Verner (1999) 
 16.9% Formal manufacturing  
Workers 
(1) with a dummy for the union status of the firm RPED 
(1994) 
Blunch and Verner (2001) 
 28.4% Formal manufacturing  
Workers 
(1) pooled regression with a dummy for the 
union status of the firm 
3 waves of RPED 
(1992, 1993, 1994) 
Teal (1996) 
      
Senegal -12.5%  (1) with an individual union membership 
dummy 
TRSV 
(1980–85) 
Terrell and Svejnar (1989)  
 
      
South Africa Between 10% and 24% Black male workers 
(blue-collar workers only) 
Depending on the methodology used 
(1), (3), (4) 
Household survey 
(1985) 
Moll (1993) 
 Between 26% and 43% Black male workers 
 
(1) with an individual union membership 
dummy. Variation of results depends on the skill 
level and economic sector 
OHS** 
(1994) 
Moll (1995) 
 21% 
Positive but not significant 
Black male workers 
White male workers 
(1) with an individual union membership 
dummy 
PSLSD*** 
(1993) 
Mwabu and Schultz (1998) 
 20% 
11% 
Black male workers 
White male workers 
(1) with an individual union membership 
dummy 
OHS 
(1995) 
Butcher and Rouse (2001) 
 83.8% and 100.5% 
Positive but not significant 
Black male workers 
White male workers 
Depending on the methodology used 
(2), (4) 
OHS 
(1999) 
Azam and Rospabé (2003) 
      
Zimbabwe Positive but not significant Formal manufacturing  
Workers 
(1) with a dummy for the union status of the 
firm. 
RPED 
(1993) 
Velenchik (1997) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses referring to econometric methodology indicate the following: 
1. OLS regression with an individual union membership dummy variable or a dummy for the union status of the firm. 
2. Treatment effect model (wage regression with a union membership dummy variable, correcting for the selection bias). 
3. Separate earnings regime for unionized and non unionized workers. 
4. Separate earnings regime for unionized and non unionized workers with endogenous switching between the two regimes. 
* Regional Program on Enterprise development (RPED), World Bank. 
** October Household Survey (OHS), Statistics South Africa. 
*** Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD), World Bank. 
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Table 2.4. Percentage of firms declaring that nonunionized workers benefit from union-
negotiated wages and benefits, 2003 
Survey group Kenya 
 
Tanzania Uganda 
Overall 58.5 
(124)  
64.2 
(104) 
58.6 
(17) 
By firm size    
[1-9] 20 
(1) 
13.3 
(2) 
0 
(0) 
[10-49] 50.7 
(34) 
53.1 
(34) 
50 
(1) 
[50-99] 65.8 
(25) 
83.3 
(30) 
50 
(2) 
>100 62.4 
(63) 
80.8 
(38) 
60.9 
(14) 
By ownership structure1    
Private domestic 58.1 
(79) 
58.4 
(66) 
42.9 
(3) 
Private foreign 47.1 
(16) 
73.3 
(22) 
62.5 
(10) 
State 81.8 
(9) 
100 
(7) 
75 
(3) 
Other 67.8 
(19) 
87.5 
(7) 
0 
(0) 
Total number of firms surveyed 284 276 300 
Note: Data in parenthesis indicate the number of respondents. 
1Private domestic (more than 50 percent of the capital is owned by the private domestic sector). 
Private foreign (more than 50 percent of the capital is owned by the private foreign sector). 
State (more than 50 percent of the capital is owned by the state). 
Other (when the owner is neither the private sector nor the state). 
Source: Authors’ computation from the firm level surveys (World Bank). 
 
The influence of trade unions on wage inequality and discrimination 
 
On wage inequality. In Ghana, Blunch, and Verner (2001) test for the presence of asymmetry 
in the union relative wage effect in the manufacturing industries. They find that unions 
mainly benefit the lower end of the wage distribution. In South Africa, Mwabu, and Schultz 
(1998) study the impact of unions on the distribution of wages. They estimate that union 
membership among black workers increases their wages by 41.2 percent at the bottom tenth 
percentile of the wage distribution and has no significant impact at the top of the 90th decile. 
Hence, these results suggest that South African trade unions narrow income inequality among 
black union members only.  
 
On wage discrimination. In Ghana, Blunch, and Verner (2001) show that discrimination 
favoring male workers, while being present in the nonunionized sector, is virtually absent in 
the unionized sector. Indeed, they find that there is a positive premium to women from being 
employed in the unionized sector (around 5 percent). In South Africa, Azam and Rospabé 
(2003) demonstrate that the impact of unionization on wages seems to be higher for black 
workers than for White workers, who get on average roughly the same wage when they are 
unionized than when they are not. This result is in accordance with Rospabé (2001). 
 
The participation of trade unions in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
 
Since 1999, African trade unions have been participating in Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSP), together with their government, other civil society organizations and in 
collaboration with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Trade unions have 
been identified as stakeholders involved in policymaking and program implementation. Egulu 
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(2004) reports their perception on the PRSP process. Almost no union has reported being 
engaged in the drafting, implementation or monitoring and evaluation. This is the case, for 
instance, in Kenya, where trade union participation in the PRSP process has been minimal. 
However, in Ghana, where unions have traditionally been politically and economically active, 
the TUC has been largely involved in the PRSP process.  
 
Box 2.1. Case studies of trade unions’ efforts to integrate informal workers  
 
Ghana 
 
Adu-Amankwah (1999) provides a few examples of the full integration of informal workers into the 
mainstream trade union movement, ranging from help to access credit and financial support, through 
training, to awareness of rights and social protection standards. For instance, the most organized 
informal sector group of workers in the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) is the Ghana 
Hairdressers and Beauticians’ Associations (GHABA). GHABA registers 4000 members spread all 
over Ghana and has its own structure from district through regional to national levels. Each member 
of the association pays an affiliation fee which in turn is given to the ICU. In return, the latter 
provides legal services for members, organizes training and leads negotiations with the Accra 
Metropolitan Assembly on tax rates and rates to be paid for shops.  
 
Zambia 
 
Fashoyin (1998) presents another illustrative example where the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU) has a policy to protect the informal sector, including the self-employed and workers in small 
enterprises. The Congress amended its constitution in 1994. It now covers the informal sector as part 
of its organizing and representational constituency. Thus, it has implemented a two-sided approach as 
a prelude to organizing these workers into trade unions. For the self-employed workers, the Congress 
seeks to help them by providing training, legal advice and sources of funds. As regards workers in 
micro and small scale enterprises, the Congress seeks to extend traditional trade union protection to 
the workers, such as social security and create in them the awareness of occupational safety and health 
issues.  
 
Kenya 
 
Kenya provides the case of a relative failure of the trade union movement to address the issue of 
workers in the informal sector (Chune and Egulu, 1999). The main obstacle that COTU had to face 
was legal. Despite the explicit nature of COTU’s constitution defining its obligations to workers of all 
categories, it could not overcome legal barriers: membership of a union is based on the existence of an 
employer-employee relationship that is not always guaranteed in the informal sector. Besides, 
informal workers are not covered by the Labor Act, nor by the Employment Act. Besides this legal 
framework constraint, the main obstacles to union organizations have to do with first, the low 
financial returns from the sector. Indeed, when informal sector workers join a trade union, their 
membership fees are either symbolic or much lower than those paid by regular wage-earners, and they 
are often irregular due to their unstable income (ILO, 1997). Second, unions point out the absence of 
ready packages of benefits to attract informal sector operating units coupled with their absence of 
previous experience of union organization (Adu-Amankwah, 1999). 
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3. Employers’ organizations 
 
In most African countries the common wisdom for many decades was that only the state 
could mobilize an “organized total effort” as a compelling development need. This notion of 
development implied the co-optation of employers’ organizations. Under such an 
arrangement, employers’ organizations forgo their legitimate right to protect their interests, 
and in return government grants them certain privileges. Moreover, following the 
predominant role of the state, the largest employer in most African countries is the 
government itself, decreasing de facto the weight of private entrepreneurs’ organizations in 
most negotiations and decision-makings. The 1990s have brought an emerging consensus that 
conditions of political liberty are essential for enhancing economic opportunity. As a 
consequence, some African governments are signaling their intent to deepen tripartite 
consultation and improve its efficiency for building better understanding between the social 
partners. Furthermore, the current trend toward privatization and market liberalization is 
reducing the role of government. Such trends have opened the door for independent, 
representative, and economically influent employers’ organizations (box 3.1).  
 
Under the ILO’s Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize 
Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 
1949 (No. 98), ratified by the majority of African countries, employers have the right to 
“gather together” to protect their interests and advance their capability to conduct their 
business in any appropriate manner consonant with national laws.11  
 
Box 3.1. Case studies of employers’ organizations  
 
Côte d’Ivoire 
 
The National Council of Ivorian Employers (CNPI) was formed on 4 December 1993 and it was 
officially registered on 30 June 1994. The council proved its credibility at the national level in 1994 
by negotiating with the government the post-devaluation support measures and wage increases with 
the central trade union in 1995. The council’s objectives consist of: 
 
• promoting free enterprise and the market economy 
• elaborating legislations that promote development and progress of industrial and commercial 
enterprises and services 
• representing and defending members’ interests before the relevant national or international 
authorities 
• providing support to members with a view to increase global efficiency. 
 
The council is a permanent member of the Labor Consultative Commission (tripartite organ) and a 
founding member of the Permanent and Independent Dialogue Commission (bipartite organ). These 
two national bodies take an active part in every negotiation. Nowadays, the council exerts a certain 
lobbying activity close to the administration, which often takes into account the council’s propositions 
in governmental project in favor of the private sector. On the whole the council represents more than 
500 private or parastatal enterprises with an aggregate workforce above 100,000 workers. 
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Ghana 
 
The Ghana Employers' Association (GEA) was formed in 1959 and later incorporated as a nonprofit 
making company. In general, the association's activities in pursuit of its functions include: 
 
• keeping members informed of the operation of existing laws and practices and legislative 
proposals which may affect, or tend to affect, the interests of employers 
• providing a forum for employers to meet, discuss, consult and exchange views, information, and 
experiences 
• representing employers' interests in government circles 
• offering consultancy services, education, training and human resource development 
• providing advice to members on management-employee relations 
• assisting members in collective agreement negotiations by providing advice, information on 
current trends, etc. and/or actually taking part in the negotiations  
• representing employers on tripartite and other bodies, national and international 
• fostering enterprise development, especially of small and medium scale enterprises 
• promoting free enterprise. 
 
Membership is open to individual employers both in the private and public sectors who employ five 
or more persons in a permanent establishment engaged in or connected with an industry, trade, 
business, education, or cultural activity.  
 
Membership 
 
Table 3.1 focuses on the manufacturing sector only and considers employers’ organizations 
membership in five selected African countries.12 Membership rates are not only quite high 
compared with union membership, but also much more homogeneous across countries, 
between 60 percent (for Uganda) and 78.6 percent (for Kenya). These five countries display 
the same ranking order for employers’ organizations membership rate as for the unionization 
rate (see table 2.2). The heterogeneous composition of employers’ organizations can result in 
conflicts of interests: small businesses versus large ones, indigenous businesses versus 
branches of multinationals, etc. There is a strong positive correlation between membership 
and firms’ size in all countries. The membership rate is always the highest in the private 
foreign owned firms. 
 
Hence, the membership of most of the employers’ organizations is composed mainly of large 
and foreign owned companies. These kinds of firm are not the most numerous, but since they 
display the highest membership rate and probably the most effective economic power, they 
could manage to have much more bargaining power inside the organizations. However, there 
does not seem to be any evidence that these associations work against the interests of small 
and medium-size firms. Large and powerful firms often try to adjust the organizations’ 
services toward small firm specific needs, even if they are never easy to implement. Useful 
services for small firms are more costly than those given to larger firms. Often the employers’ 
organizations can be reluctant to make up some of the deficit of management resources 
existing in small firms. 
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Table 3.1. Producer or trade association membership in selected African countries 
 Survey group Ethiopia Kenya Tanzania Uganda Zambia 
  (2002) (2003) (2003) (2003) (2002) 
63.0 78.6 65.4 60.0 69.1 Percentage of firms members of an 
employers' association 1 (427) 2 (281) (269) (300) (207) 
By firm size           
43.8 60.0 17.0 22.2 100.0 [1-9] 
(176) (10) (47) (54) (1) 
69.4 60.4 56.6 57.5 56.7 [10-49] 
(134) (91) (106) (153) (60) 
89.3 91.3 93.8 67.6 68.0 [50-99] 
(28) (46) (48) (34) (50) 
83.2 88.8 95.4 96.6 80.5 >100 
(89) (116) (65) (59) (87) 
By ownership structure           
59.1 74.9 62.1 54.3 68.0 Private domestic 
(342) (187) (198) (223) (147) 
93.8 94.3 88.4 81.3 73.1 Private foreign 
(16) (35) (43) (64) (52) 
77.2 86.7 70.0 71.4 66.7 State 
(57) (15) (10) (7) (6) 
66.7 78.6 23.1 20.0 50.0 Other 
(12) (42) (13) (5) (2) 
Total number of firms surveyed 427 284 276 300 207 
Note: Data in parentheses indicate number of respondents. 
1 Firms report to be member of a producer or a trade association. 
Source: Authors’ computation from the firm level surveys (World Bank). 
 
Services 
 
Table 3.2 focuses on the manufacturing sector only and displays the value of employers’ 
organizations services in five African countries. In the RPED surveys, firms were asked how 
important each employers’ organization service is to the firm. Hence, this “value” is not the 
effective performance of employers’ organizations but rather the perceived importance and 
effectiveness of each service provided to the firm.13  
 
Table 3.2 highlights that the most important service provided by employers’ organizations to 
member firms is the supply of information concerning current or new government 
regulations. Furthermore, even firms with more than fifty percent of their capital owned by 
the state need information about current or new government regulations. 
 
A significant number of firms regard the lobbying role of their association as being of major 
or crucial importance for their business. The percentage of firms which value the lobbying 
actions as a major service increases with firms’ size. Small and large member firms may not 
have the same priority in terms of economic policies that should be undertaken. However, as 
seen above (table 3.1), the composition of the coalition does not favor small firms as they are 
less represented in employers’ organizations than the large ones. The composition effect and 
their limited bargaining power may both prevent small firms to impose their specific 
economic point of view. As a result, the lobbying organization does not seem to put pressure 
on the government to implement small firms’ favorable reforms, even if about a quarter of 
very small firms quote this service as a crucial one. 
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Table 3.2. Producer or trade association services 
 Survey group Ethiopia Kenya Tanzania Uganda Zambia 
  
Service item 
(2002) (2003) (2003) (2003) (2002) 
Lobbying government 32.2 (214) 2 49.1 (212) 32.9 (164) 43.0 (165) 30.8 (130) 
Resolution of disputes 17.4 (184) 37.7 (207) 28.5 (123) 25.0 (140) 23.5 (51) 
Percentage of firms quoting the item as an 
important service 1 
Information on regulations 40.4 (223) 55.2 (210) 50.3 (159) 48.5 (165) 39.8 (118) 
By firm size                       
Lobbying government 29.0 (62) 25.0 (4) 0.0 (7) 22.2 (9) 0.0 (1) 
Resolution of disputes 25.0 (56) 75.0 (4) 0.0 (6) 27.9 (10) 0.0 (1) 
[1-9] 
Information on regulations 32.8 (58) 75.0 (4) 25.0 (8) 27.3 (11) 0.0 (1) 
Lobbying government 30.7 (75) 40.7 (54) 25.5 (55) 32.1 (81) 20.7 (29) 
Resolution of disputes 7.7 (65) 42.6 (54) 23.1 (39) 23.5 (70) 37.5 (8) 
[10-49] 
Information on regulations 40.0 (80) 52.8 (53) 50.0 (48) 40.7 (81) 43.5 (23) 
Lobbying government 50.0 (20) 38.1 (42) 29.3 (41) 47.6 (21) 20.0 (30) 
Resolution of disputes 26.7 (15) 29.3 (41) 35.3 (34) 27.5 (17) 36.4 (11) 
[50-99] 
Information on regulations 56.5 (23) 52.4 (42) 65.1 (43) 57.9 (19) 28.6 (28) 
Lobbying government 31.6 (57) 61.2 (98) 40.0 (60) 61.1 (54) 39.4 (66) 
Resolution of disputes 18.8 (48) 38.9 (95) 30.2 (43) 10.0 (43) 16.7 (30) 
>100 
Information on regulations 41.9 (62) 60.2 (98) 42.4 (59) 61.1 (54) 41.9 (62) 
By ownership structure                       
Lobbying government 33.1 (163) 46.6 (133) 32.7 (113) 40.0 (110) 29.2 (89) 
Resolution of disputes 18.1 (138) 33.3 (132) 24.1 (87) 24.8 (101) 28.2 (39) 
Private domestic 
Information on regulations 39.1 (169) 51.5 (130) 50.9 (110) 44.9 (107) 35.0 (80) 
Lobbying government 50.0 (14) 57.6 (33) 27.8 (36) 50.0 (48) 33.3 (36) 
Resolution of disputes 14.3 (14) 45.2 (31) 39.1 (23) 26.5 (34) 8.3 (12) 
Private foreign 
Information on regulations 50.0 (14) 57.6 (33) 47.1 (34) 52.9 (51) 52.9 (34) 
Lobbying government 22.6 (31) 33.3 (12) 42.9 (7) 40.0 (5) 50.0 (4) 
Resolution of disputes 19.2 (26) 27.3 (11) 33.3 (6) 0.0 (4) - (0) 
State 
Information on regulations 38.2 (34) 30.8 (13) 57.1 (7) 60.0 (5) 33.3 (3) 
Lobbying government 16.7 (6) 53.1 (32) 33.3 (3) 0.0 (1) 0.0 (1) 
Resolution of disputes 0.0 (6) 48.4 (31) 50.0 (2) - (0) - (0) 
Other 
Information on regulations 66.7 (6) 75.0 (32) 66.7 (3) 100.0 (1) 0.0 (1) 
Total number of firms surveyed   427 284 276 300 207 
Note: Data in parentheses indicate number of respondents. 
1 Indicates the percentage of firms that have associated a value of 3 or 4 to each employers’ organization service. Knowing that: 0 = no value; 1 = minor value; 2 = moderate value; 3 = major value; 4 = critical 
value to the firm. 
Source: Authors’ computation from the firm level surveys (World Bank). 
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Organizations’ assistance to their members during disputes with officials, workers or other firms 
appears to be the least valuable service for firms.  
 
There is no significant difference when looking at firms’ size or ownership structure. In fact, 
disputes against officials, workers, or other firms seem to be much more related to firms’ level 
problems that do not require any coalition to be formed to get solved. 
 
Kenya, which displays the highest membership ratio, exhibits also the highest proportion of 
firms assigning a major value to organizations’ services. This suggests that the employers’ 
organizations membership and the perceived quality of their services seem to be related. 
 
The role of employers’ organizations in the informal sector 
 
The majority of employers’ organizations see the informal sector as unfair competition. Most 
employers’ organizations see their key role as assisting the migration of informal enterprises into 
the formal sector, though this is not always seen as a high priority. The employers’ organizations 
use their influence to remove regulatory obstacles to small and medium-size enterprises, which 
seem most pronounced and most entrenched as bases for bribery and similar corruption in 
African countries.14 
 
Developing the link between the formal and the informal sectors 
 
Formal-informal firms’ cooperation can develop on the basis of subcontracting relationship.15 
This is the reason why some employers’ organizations have begun encouraging the establishment 
of associations of micro and small entrepreneurs and businesses. In fact, these employers’ 
organizations have established, often in cooperation with the ILO, programs such as “Improve 
Your Business” and “Start Your Business” 16 for this category of members. 
 
Evidence suggests that including micro-entrepreneurs into formal employers’ associations is not 
necessarily the most effective type of organization to overcome constraints in access to credit 
and training resulting in low productivity. Informal workers’ organizations, home workers’ 
associations and informal sector cooperatives often mobilize to obtain credit, inputs and training 
at more advantageous conditions. 
Another strategy adopted by cooperative-type informal sector associations has been to pool 
resources and assets with other trade associations. For example, in Benin approximately 1,600 
micro-enterprises, employing about 6,500 people, are organized in some 60 mutual savings and 
loan associations. 
 
These associations combine traditional solidarity-based saving and credit practices with 
economic effectiveness. Apart from their high rate of recovery and observance of repayment 
schedules, these associations have shown a growing propensity to lend out the savings collected, 
thus increasing their contribution to capital formation. They have been vested with a legal 
personality recognized by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and are governed by by-laws drawn 
up by their members. Legal recognition by the ministry has acted as a deterrent against abusive 
practices by local government agencies. Local proximity and social control have proved the key 
to their success. 
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In many countries, the government has become more active in developing targeted interventions 
to overcome various constraints faced by the informal sector. But well-intentioned government 
measures do not always yield the desired result. For instance, in Côte d’Ivoire (Gaufryau and 
Maldonado, 1997), a government policy to create a truly representative and functional national 
craft association failed to produce the expected results because the organizational structure 
proposed was too bureaucratic and complex. 
 
The role of the International Finance Corporation 
 
To reach the African private sector and respond to its needs, the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) is establishing a different product mix, involving both investment and 
noninvestment services. IFC is working with the International Development Association to 
launch comprehensive programs targeted at micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSME) in 10 
African countries. The proposed MSME Program aims at reducing constraints to growth and 
competitiveness by increasing access to finance, helping firms to find new markets by building 
their technical capacity, and reducing regulation to enable more private sector participation.17 
 
A key resource for capacity building is IFC’s Africa Project Development Facility (APDF). To 
make it more effective in meeting demand, IFC is increasing the scale of APDF’s operations 
under a new and more flexible funding model. In addition, IFC is piloting a new model for 
delivering its services to smaller businesses through Small and Medium Enterprise Solutions 
Centers. Each center will be an integrated “storefront” of services and financing for small and 
medium enterprises, including short- and long-term finance, capacity building, access to 
information, and approaches to improving the business-enabling environment. The first Solutions 
Center opened last year in Madagascar.  
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4. Social dialogue, collective bargaining,  
and labor-management relations 
 
The social dialogue of labor relations prevailing in Africa usually involves either two principal 
parties (the workers’ and the employers’ organizations) or three (those two parties plus the state). 
Collective bargaining or cooperation, whether bipartite or tripartite, generally occurs either 
informally in ad hoc bodies or formally through advisory or negotiating institutions.  
 
Bipartite social dialogue 
 
The social dialogue directly between workers’ and employers’ organizations encompasses the 
institutions of collective bargaining, the resolution of disputes and strikes, and the modes of 
labor-management cooperation. 
 
Collective bargaining institutions 
 
The literature on collective bargaining usually focuses on the level and the coverage of collective 
bargaining institutions. 
 
The level of collective bargaining. In most African countries, sectoral and company-level 
bargaining systems prevail. As underlined by Fashoyin (1998), “in many African countries, 
public policy designs had tacitly promoted sectoral or industry level bargaining relationship, 
ostensibly to create some sort of stability in labor relations.” Hence, in many African countries, 
such as South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe for instance, bargaining at the industry level has 
been a major feature of the collective bargaining system. However, despite this support of public 
policy for centralized bargaining, enterprise bargaining exists. This is the structure of bargaining 
prevalent in such countries as Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Kenya, 
and Ethiopia.18 
 
 
In Southern Africa, following the liberalization process, the trend toward enterprise-level 
bargaining has intensified in the 1990s with the employers (workers) recognizing the need to 
have more flexibility in the design of pay for productivity and competitiveness (Fashoyin, 1998). 
This is the case for instance in Zambia, where bargaining system in the banking industry shifted 
from industry-wide bargaining arrangements (through a Joint Industrial Council Agreements) to 
firm-level negotiation. A similar development occurred in Botswana. Finally, in Zimbabwe, 
although the sectoral level is still the most prevalent level (under the National Employment 
Councils), bargaining at the works councils in enterprise has recently increased. 
 
Box 4.1. Case studies of collective bargaining systems 
 
South Africa 
 
Centralized bipartite bargaining structures. The Labour Relation Act (LRA) of 1995 promotes the use of 
centralized bargaining structures. It retains the previous Industrial Councils, now renamed Bargaining 
Councils and extends these also to the public service. At the end of 2002, according to the Department of 
 23
Labour, there were 62 Bargaining Councils, compared with 81 in 1994, indicating a substantial 
deregistration of Bargaining Councils since 1995. These Councils can cover a specific industry, 
occupation, and area (either the whole country, province or cities). Bargaining Council agreements can 
deal with items such as wages and conditions of service, retrenchment procedures, grading systems, etc. 
The “Compulsory centralization” whereby the Bargaining Councils agreements can be extended to 
nonparties still prevails under the LRA 1995. According to Moll (1996), the abolition of these “ergo 
omnes” rules, involving the enforcement of too high minimum wages for the small firms, would probably 
generate an increase in employment. However, as Bezuidenhout (2000) argues, only a third of the private 
sector employees are covered by such agreements. Also, as indicated above, firms can apply for 
exemption from Bargaining Council agreements. In 80 percent of cases, these exemptions are granted 
(ILO, 1999). In a number of sectors, national bargaining forums have been established by mutual 
agreement between employers and unions. For instance, this the case in the gold and coal mining sector 
between the NUM and the Chamber of Mines. 
 
Decentralized bargaining structures. In terms of the organizational rights now accorded to unions by the 
LRA 1995, if a union proves sufficient or majority representation in the firm, the employer cannot easily 
refuse to recognize the union as the bargaining unit at the firm level. Negotiation can be conducted “on all 
matters of mutual interest,” such as wages, working conditions, training, discipline, grievances, 
retrenchment, job grading, etc. If the thrust of the LRA of 1995 toward a more centralized bargaining 
system is reflected in practice, then the institution of plant-level bargaining may gradually disappear. This 
might be supported by the fact that the workplace forums introduced in the LRA—representing all the 
employees in the workplace—might, in the future perform many of the functions of plant-level unions 
(Bendix, 1996). 
 
Kenya 
 
Collective bargaining has a long tradition in Kenya. Today, an average of over 300 collective agreements, 
mostly made on an individual employer basis, are signed annually in Kenya (Fashoyin 2001). However, 
the number of collective agreements registered has fallen due to growing economic difficulties, which 
have caused business closures, or have induced the parties to continue with existing conditions or even to 
abandon the bargaining process altogether. Both the Trade Disputes Act and the 1962 Industrial Relations 
Charter authorize collective bargaining between unions and employers to establish wages and conditions 
of employment. The government permits wage increases of up to 100 percent and renegotiation of 
collective agreements; however, the law allows employers in ailing industries to dismiss workers 
regardless of the provisions of their collective bargaining agreements. Collective bargaining agreements 
must be registered with the Industrial Court to ensure adherence to these guidelines. Collective bargaining 
can take place at the industry or sectoral level and the company level. As a result of the economic 
difficulties of the late 1990s, bargaining at the industry-level has become increasingly unpopular in recent 
years and there has been a growing shift toward individual bargaining at the company-level. Indeed, 
company-level bargaining leaves room for both sides to adjust employment conditions to their particular 
situation. 
 
Collective bargaining coverage. In some countries, the collective bargaining agreements 
negotiated by unions also prevail for nonunionized workers. In that case, collective bargaining 
coverage rate is higher than the unionization rate. The difference between these two rates comes 
from legal constraints and institutional background.  
 
Collective bargaining coverage ranges from 25 percent to 40 percent. When appropriate figures 
are available,19 union density generally appears to be lower than collective bargaining coverage, 
Zambia aside. A survey conducted in the South African manufacturing sector (the South African 
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Labor Flexibility Survey) presents a different picture of the Bargaining Councils coverage 
(Macun, 1997). It shows that in 1996, 65 percent of the firms that were surveyed are subject to 
Bargaining Councils agreements, be they party to such agreements or nonparties to whom 
agreement had been extended. The distribution of those firms by employment size was found 
fairly even, with a smaller proportion of larger firm subject to Bargaining Councils agreement. 
 
Resolution of disputes and strikes 
 
Dispute resolution. An important element of a sound labor relations system is the provision of an 
effective and practical dispute settlement machinery. Betcherman et al. (2001) bring out for 
developed countries a move away from court-based procedures and adversarial encounters 
toward alternative nonjudicial approaches that focus on conciliation and arbitration. The 
dominant innovation over the past half-century has been the introduction of administrative labor 
tribunals as an alternative to litigation. When considering the introduction of these alternative 
dispute resolution approaches in developing countries, the authors raise some reserves related to 
the support of cultural an institutional norms, the availability of trained and trainable mediators, 
sustainable financing and adequate legal foundation. They further highlight that this policy can 
be a good complement to court procedures that are long and costly but should not be a substitute 
to an effective judicial system aimed at enforcing labor legal standards.  
 
In many African countries, dispute resolution processes have been dominated by the state via the 
Ministry of Labor, usually through its conciliation and mediation services (Fashoyin, 1998). 
Labor Courts have been established to resolve disputes that could not been settled by the 
government machinery. One exception is South Africa where an independent conciliation and 
arbitration system (the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration) has been 
created. In Southern Africa, these government conciliation services have generally become 
deficient mostly due to the reduction in resources of labor administration as well as a lack of 
definition of the procedures for settling disputes (Fashoyin, 1998). As a consequence, the labor 
court, which should be the ultimate authority in the dispute settlement system, is overburdened 
by too many premature referrals. 
 
Strike activity. Strikes constitute the most obvious form of industrial action, beside go-slows, 
boycott, overtime bans etc. Statistics on strikes in Africa are sparse and highly dependent on the 
data source.20 The Laborsta from the ILO provides some figures of the strike activity for a few 
selected African countries.  
 
• First, strike activity seems to be significant during the 1990s in only a small number of 
countries, namely Kenya, South Africa, and Zambia. In other countries, the number of strikes 
rarely exceeds 20 a year. 
 
• Second, among these three countries, only Zambia has experienced a steady decrease in the 
number of strikes in the 1990s. According to Fashoyin (2002), this might be attributed to the 
effectiveness of the dispute settlement machinery but it is mostly the threat of job losses that 
contributed to this change. In South Africa and Kenya, strike activity is much more volatile, 
but seems to have greatly declined since 1998. 
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The main reason for strike action is related to wage, other motives such as grievance and 
disciplinary issues remaining secondary. For instance, in 1999 in South Africa, around 97 
percent of strikes were due to wage disputes.21 French-speaking countries have been particularly 
affected by unpaid salaries problems during the last decade (Mayaki, 2002 and Linard, 2002). 
 
Firm level surveys conducted in a few African countries also supply some information on strike 
activity. In every country, a high percentage of the manufacturing firms surveyed does not report 
any days of production lost to strikes and labor unrest. In Zambia, for instance, only 3 percent of 
firms have been declaring some kind of damages. However, prevalence of strikes and labor 
unrest appears to be higher in Ethiopia and Nigeria.  
 
Box 4.2. Case studies of dispute settlement South Africa 
 
South Africa 
 
South Africa, has, since the passage of the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1924 had an official dispute 
settlement machinery. It was only after the unfair labor practice concept and the Industrial Court were 
introduced in the 1979 and subsequent amendments to the Labour Relations Act that the settlement of 
individual disputes received increased attention. 22 
 
The Labour Relation Act of 1995 has maintained the essential voluntarism of the dispute settlement 
machinery by providing the freedom to submit disputes to conciliation or mediation and arbitration, or in 
certain instances, to the Labour Court (which replaces the Industrial Court). A new body, the Commission 
for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) has been established to take much of the load 
previously carried by the Industrial Court. The legislation provided that the CCMA be independent of the 
state, any political party, union, or employers’ organization. Furthermore, bargaining councils and 
independent agencies may now be accredited as mediators and arbitrators by the CCMA.  
 
Disputes of rights may be submitted first to conciliation or mediation by either the CCMA, a bargaining 
council, or its accredited agent and thereafter to arbitration by one of the above or, in certain instances, to 
adjudication by the Labour Court. Disputes of interest may also be submitted first to conciliation or 
mediation. If this fails, parties may choose voluntary arbitration or engage in industrial action, except in 
essential services. The act interprets conciliation to include fact finding, mediation, and even advisory 
arbitration.23  
 
Ghana 
 
The law provides for an independent National Labor Commission, made up of government, employers 
and organized labor representatives, responsible for settling disputes, first through mediation, then 
through arbitration. However, the Industrial Relations Act (IRA) provides for compulsory arbitration by 
the minister to resolve a dispute if one party to the dispute advocates compulsory arbitration. This 
procedure would allow employers to renege on their commitment to bargain in good faith and instead call 
for arbitration, violating the right to collective bargaining. The ILO has informed the government that 
compulsory arbitration is acceptable only when called for by both parties. 
 
Kenya 
 
The dispute settlement machinery in Kenya is designed to ensure that collective bargaining is adequately 
used in settling disputes and to ensure that disputes are appropriately and promptly settled (Fashoyin 
2001). The law requires that all disputes be reviewed by the Tripartite Committee, which then decides on 
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one of three courses of action. It may first decide that the parties have not exhausted the collective 
bargaining machinery and return the dispute to the parties. Then, if it decides that the internal machinery 
has been exhausted, it can decide to send the dispute for investigation (generally rights disputes) or 
conciliation (generally for disputes concerning interests relating to one of the many items that are usually 
covered in collective bargaining agreements). 
 
In 2000, over 946 reported disputes, 500 were settled at the investigation level, 136 at the conciliation 
level and 124 went trough the Industrial Court. The dispute resolution settlement machinery has thus been 
supportive of the collective bargaining process in the country. 
 
Labor-management cooperation 
 
Management and unions have their own particular reasons for supporting participative programs. 
Whereas management may see participation as a means of obtaining greater commitment and 
cooperation from the workforce, unions view it as a means of extending employee influence and 
control at the workplace. However, both parties may also have certain reservations regarding 
participation. Management may object to participation because it delays decision-making, takes 
control out of the hands of the employer and may prioritize employee goals against the goals of 
the organization. Unions, on their part, encounter practical problems in demarcating areas for 
participation from those subjected to collective bargaining (Bendix, 1996). These worker 
participation and joint decision-making schemes are entrenched in law in a few countries, for 
instance in Swaziland, Zimbabwe and more recently in South Africa.  
 
According to Fashoyin (1998), in countries such as Swaziland and Zimbabwe, national labor 
policies have promoted works councils as a mechanism for giving worker a voice, particularly 
where the union is either weak or nonexistent. In practice, however, some employers have seen 
the works council as a substitute for the union. However, Fashoyin also underlines that in 
Zimbabwe, works councils increasingly deal with issues that were previously exclusive of the 
sectoral level bargaining (in the so-called National Employment Councils). 
 
Tripartite social dialogue  
 
Many African countries have introduced tripartite cooperation framework as an essential 
mechanism for reaching good labor relations, increasing productivity, as well as a means of 
building consensus on socioeconomic issues. As a result, institutional structure such as the Labor 
Advisory Council (or board or committee) have been created in practically all English-speaking 
African countries in the post-independence period. These labor advisory bodies have been 
effective in dealing with issues of ratification of international standards, as well as the review of 
national legislation (Fashoyin, 1998).  
 
Two main distinguishable types of tripartite consultation currently exist in Africa: the formal 
consultative and advisory institutions and the formal negotiating bodies. A third type can be 
added, which includes institutions providing opportunities for the social partners to discuss 
issues of broad national development that have no direct connection with the operation of the 
labor market (Fashoyin, 1997).  
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The formal consultative and advisory institutions 
 
The formal consultative and advisory institutions are generally dealing with all labor issues.  
 
It is often just after independence that these kind of tripartite cooperation institutions were 
established in Africa. In Senegal, for instance, the National Advisory Council on Labor and 
Social Security, created in the Labor Code Act of 1961, is still in use today. However, according 
to Dieng (1999) its operating methods and efficacy appear to be substandard. 
 
In English-speaking countries, many of the labor advisory bodies, created in post-independence 
periods have been replaced by more recent structures in the 1990s. For example, in Malawi, the 
Labor Relations Act of 1996 created a Tripartite Labor Consultative Council which replaced the 
National Labor Policy Committee settled in 1969 but lapsed into oblivion by 1971. In Ethiopia, 
arguably tripartism started in the 1960s with the creation of the Labor Advisory Board in 1963, 
which until the 1990s was unable to meet regularly mostly because of resource shortage and 
organizational inadequacies of the Ministry of Labor (Buckley et al., 2004). However, the 
recently adopted labor law (Labor Proclamation 2003) sets up a new Labor Advisory Board. 
 
In other countries, formal national consultative tripartite institutions have only been officially set 
up in the 1990s. This is the case in Zambia where until the establishment of the Tripartite 
Consultative Labor Council in 1993, tripartite meetings were held periodically on an ad hoc basis 
(Fashoyin, 2002).  
 
These bodies, whatever their name—Labor Advisory Board (Kenya, Nigeria, Swaziland, 
Tanzania), Consultative Labor Commission (Côte d’Ivoire, Mozambique), Tripartite 
Consultative Labor Council (Zambia, Malawi)—all share the same features: they mostly have an 
advisory role to the government, represented mainly by the minister of labor. Their role is 
limited to the area of labor relations policy (i.e., formulation and review of legislation and 
matters pertaining to international labor standards). 
 
A variant of this type of institutions have been set up in many countries to deal with specific 
labor subjects. Institutions in this group include those which have been established to deal with 
safety and health, such as the National Advisory Committee on Occupational Health and Safety 
set up in 1990 in Kenya or training, such as the Technical Education, Vocational and 
Entrepreneurship Training Authority in Zambia. 
 
The formal negotiating bodies 
 
The second type of tripartite dialogue institutions includes formal negotiating bodies. The main 
distinguishing characteristic of this type of tripartite machinery is that, unlike the first type, it has 
the capability to negotiate and arrive at binding conclusion. The outstanding example is the 
National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) of South Africa. In Africa, 
institutions of this type are decidedly few. The closest resemblance to this type of institutions is 
the Botswana’s National Employment Manpower and Income Commission. Although the latter 
is not a negotiating body, its conclusions are sent to Cabinet for further determination (Fashoyin, 
1997) 
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By and large, Zimbabwe abandoned its effort to set up a body similar to NEDLAC and created 
the National Economic Consultative Forum (NECF) in 1997, as a multi-party forum for 
discussion of national socioeconomic issues. Unlike NEDLAC, the NECF is a consultative group 
without decision-making power, however, given its high profile, it has a potential of getting its 
conclusions translated into policy (Fashoyin, 1997). 
 
A variant of this type are the ad hoc tripartite forums, which are typically established outside the 
existing framework. Their mandate is usually to find immediate solutions to the particular 
problem that might have warranted their establishment. When ad hoc bodies of this type are set 
up, they invariably serve as negotiating forum. In Nigeria, this approach has turned to be the de 
facto method of resolving labor disputes of national significance. Thus, in 1988 and again in 
1991, ad hoc arrangements were used to negotiate palliatives means to reduce the impact of the 
SAPs on workers. Although Kenya’s permanent consultative machinery has operated mainly as a 
consultative organ, effort at negotiation has always arisen outside the tripartite framework 
(Fashoyin, 1997).  
 
The limits of tripartite social dialogue 
 
As highlighted by Fashoyin (1998), generally, most of the tripartite machinery in African 
countries shares common disabling characteristics. Their advisory nature tends to discourage 
effective participation among the social partners. It also has the tendency to confine consultation 
to predetermined labor issues. In the majority of tripartite consultative machinery in Africa the 
government representation is limited to the Ministry of Labor. A meaningful tripartite 
cooperation should require the participation of all arms of government that are directly 
concerned with policies that have direct or indirect effect on labor issues. The NEDLAC 
experiment seems to be a successful attempt in implementing this multiparties involvement.  
 
In some African countries, tripartite consultations have been a kind of state-controlled 
arrangements where the social partners were co-opted into the socioeconomic decision-making 
process. Etukudo (1995) uses the concept of corporatism to define this kind of arrangements 
whereby the interests of social partners are integrated in state structures. Tripartism thus became 
a charade in many African countries as the social partners were mostly manipulated. 
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1 Convention No. 87 (1948) stipulates that workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the 
right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to join organizations of their own 
choosing without previous authorization. 
2 Convention No. 87 (1948) stipulates that the public authorities shall refrain from any interference which would 
restrict the right to organize freely and shall not dissolve or suspend any employers’ or employees’ organizations. 
3 ILO jurisprudence identifies occupations for which a strike could be prohibited, due to their essential nature, as 
those where there exist a clear and imminent threat to the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the 
population. 
4 Convention No. 98 (1949) stipulates that each country which ratifies this Convention shall encourage and promote 
the full development and utilization of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers or employers' 
organizations and workers' organizations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by 
means of collective agreements 
5 Convention No. 100 (1951) emphasizes certain proposals with regard to the principle of equal remuneration for 
men and women workers for work of equal value. The term equal remuneration for men and women workers for 
work of equal value refers to rates of remuneration established without discrimination based on sex. 
6 Convention No. 138 (1973) stipulates that each country for which this Convention is in force undertakes to pursue 
a national policy designed to ensure the effective abolition of child labor and to raise progressively the minimum age 
for admission to employment or work to a level consistent with the fullest physical and mental development of 
young persons. 
7 Note however that the sample is quite small with only 79 firms surveyed. 
8 Together with Malaysia, Mexico and Bangladesh where the union-nonunion wage differential exceeds 10 percent 
(Salmon, 2001). 
9 Figures for Uganda have to be taken cautiously as only 17 firms answered that question. 
10 Fraction of the firms in sectors that have at least one organized worker. 
11 Etukudo (1995) 
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12 The question about employers’ organization membership was not asked during RPED surveys in Eritrea and 
Nigeria. 
13 The survey identifies three main services which are usually provided to the firm by its employers’ organization. 
The first one is its capacity to lobby the government and hence to influence regulatory, economic or judicial 
decisions. Then, employers’ organization main role is to defend its members during resolution of disputes which can 
be either with officials, workers or other firms. Finally, the organization may be useful to provide information to its 
members about current or new government regulations. 
14 ILO (2004) 
15 ILO (1997) 
16 Start and Improve Your Business (SIYB) program is part of the ILO's International Small Enterprise Program. 
The SIYB program has been designed to provide a sustainable and cost-effective method of reaching substantial 
numbers of small-scale entrepreneurs and provide them with the management skills needed for profitability in a 
competitive environment. Aimed at a variety of target groups, it deals with various topics related to small-enterprise 
development such as training, business counseling, monitoring and evaluation, and networking. Small-enterprise 
development institutions in more than 70 countries worldwide have used the SIYB program. 
17 International Finance Corporation, Small and Medium-Size Enterprises Group, African Project Development 
Facility (2003 Annual Report).  
18 Some authors (for a review, see Aidt and Tzannatos, 2001) prefer using the larger notion of bargaining 
coordination which may encompass one or more of the following aspects: the degree of unions centralization, union 
concentration, the extent of employer centralization, the level of bargaining, the degree of informal coordination and 
corporatism.  
19 In order to be compared, the collective bargaining coverage and union density must refer to the same population, 
here the formal wage sector. 
20 The case of Kenya provides an illustration of this variability. The laborsta data source of the ILO reported 44 
strikes, involving 16,029 workers in 1997. Whereas, according to Fashoyin (2001), the 1997 annual report of the 
Kenyan Ministry of Labor registered 97 strikes, involving 270,660 workers. 
21 Department of Labor, Annual Report 1999, Pretoria. 
22 Mostly based on Bendix (1996) 
23 The CCMA improved its settlement rate for conciliation to 73 percent of cases heard between April and 
September 2001. The daily average number of referrals was 477. A total of 67 percent of cases conciliated within 
the statutory framework were finalized and there are on average 212 arbitration per day (Department of Labor, 
2001–02 Report, Pretoria).  
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